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UNILATERAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS IN ASSESSING ANTI-
COMPETITIVE MERGERS: THE JUDICIALLY APPROVED NEW 
APPROACH TO CHALLENGING MERGERS 
I. INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST UNILATERAL EFFECTS 
Domestic and global merger activity has escalated to new highs in recent 
years.  Since 1991, the number of merger filings has tripled.1  In the last year, 
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Antitrust Division of Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) have been inundated with pre-merger notification filings.2  
These antitrust enforcement agencies have responded by challenging more 
mergers for anti-competitive reasons.3  Until recently, an agency challenge 
may not have been an alarming signal to an antitrust lawyer seeking to move a 
company merger forward.  While the government enforcement agencies have 
been successful in stifling potential mergers through the force of its 
 
 1. See FTC: FTC Wraps Up Record Year in Antitrust Enforcement, M2 Presswire, Oct. 9, 
1998, available in 1998 WL 16526888 [hereinafter FTC Record Year]. 
 2. See Michael L. Weiner, Surfing the Merger Wave, 12-SUM ANTITRUST 4 (1998). In 
1998, there were a record 4,643 premerger notification filings, a 25% increase over 1997.  FTC 
Record Year, supra note 1, at 1.  Premerger notification requirements are identified in the Hart-
Scott-Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §18a (1988).  William J. 
Kolasky, Jr. & James W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at the Federal Trade Commission: 
Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 891 (1997).  Firms have 
to notify the FTC and DOJ of an expected merger if the transaction is valued at $15 million or 
more and one firm has at least $100 million  in sales or assets and at least one other firm has $10 
million or more in sales or assets. Id. 
 3. FTC Record Year, supra note 2. Growth in DOJ merger investigations has been dramatic 
with 134 in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 1995, 237 in FY 1996, and 277 in FY 1997. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Antitrust Enforcement At DOJ: An Economist’s Perspective, Address Before The Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 17, 1997) 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1370.htm>.  Even though FTC enforcement actions 
have not grown at DOJ’s rate (i.e., 27 in FY 1996 & 1997, and 33 in FY 1998), the number of 
litigated cases has surged (while averaging 1.1 litigated decisions per year from 1990 through 
1996, the FTC litigated 3 cases simultaneously in the summer of 1998). See Joe Sims & Deborah 
P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study 
in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 
867 (1997); See also Willard K. Tom, What’s Really Going On Inside The Beltway?, Remarks 
Before the Insight Information Conference (Oct. 20, 1998) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/insight1.htm>.  Furthermore, mergers today involve 
transactions that are a great deal higher in value than the typical mergers of the 1980s. Rubinfeld, 
supra. 
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administrative offices, the FTC and DOJ have generally chosen not to litigate 
to enjoin a merger.4  The FTC and DOJ are, however, no longer allowing 
mergers to occur with only a few curtailing provisions in a consent decree.5  
By adding talented, experienced antitrust attorneys to their staffs6 the agencies 
are foregoing the traditional market analysis approach set forth in the their 
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and taking a more aggressive approach to 
merger enforcement.7 
The agencies are now using new techniques in antitrust economics such as 
“Unilateral Effects Analysis”8 to predict anti-competitive effects of potential 
horizontal mergers.9  Prior to FTC v. Staples, the antitrust enforcement 
agencies had not convinced a court of the validity of this approach in assessing 
the potential harm of a merger.10  But due to the recent judicial acceptance of 
 
 4. Sims, supra note 3, at 868-69. 
 5. See Tom, supra note 3, at 7 (noting the FTC’s increased willingness to litigate in the last 
few years rather than bow out and accept a proposed consent decree).  Willard K. Tom is Deputy 
Director of the Bureau of Competition at the FTC.  Id.; see also Joel I. Klein, The Importance of 
Antitrust Enforcement in the New Economy, Address Before The New York State Bar Association 
Antitrust Law Section Program (Jan. 29, 1998), 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1338.htm> (citing the DOJ’s three merger challenges 
in the summer of 1998 as a modern day record for the agency). Joel I. Klein is Assistant Attorney 
General for the DOJ Antitrust Division. Id. See, e.g. F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 
(D.D.C. 1997); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 1998 WL 433784 (D.D.C 1998); 
U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 983 F.Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 6. Weiner, supra note 2, at 4 (citing John R. Wilke & Bryan Gruley, In Merger Blitz, 
Regulators Vie to Bust Biggest Prizes, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1998, at B1). 
 7. See Robert H. Lande & James Langenfeld, From The Surrogates To Stories: The 
Evolution of Federal Merger Policy, 11-SPG ANTITRUST 5, 5-6 (1997). 
 8. The agencies state that unilateral effects surface when “merging firms [] find it profitable 
to alter their behavior unilaterally following the acquisition by elevating price and suppressing 
output,” without regard to other market competitors.  Yvonne S. Quinn, An Overview Of Merger 
Analysis, 987 PLI/CORP 417, 444 (1997) (quoting 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §2.2); For 
a discussion of the new techniques used to evaluate unilateral effects, see infra Part III.B. 
 9. See Michael L. Weiner, Explaining New Theories of Unilateral Effects, 11-SPG 
ANTITRUST 4,4 (1997).  Horizontal mergers involve “two [or more] firms [that] are (or could be) 
direct competitors, manufacturing the same product or providing the same service, and serving 
customers in the same general geographic market.”  Barbara A. Reeves, Acquisitions and 
Mergers, 1049 PLI/CORP 569, 585 (1998).  Firms involved in a vertical merger are not in the 
same market, but “stand in a supplier-customer or manufacturer-dealer relationship.” Id.  The 
federal agencies focus primarily on evaluating horizontal mergers because vertical mergers are 
less likely to create competitive problems.  See A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 
12, HORIZONTAL MERGERS: LAW AND POLICY 328 (1986) [hereinafter A.B.A. HORIZONTAL 
MERGERS]. 
 10. Courts have failed to adopt unilateral effects analysis in lieu of traditional structural 
approach. See, e.g. Moore Corp., Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 
1581-82 (D. Del. 1995), discussed in James F. Rill, Practicing What They Preach: One Lawyer’s 
View of Econometric Models in Differentiated Products Mergers, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 393, 
394, 406 (1997).  Courts have also rejected agencies empirical estimations of unilateral effects 
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this truncated merger analysis,11 counsel for companies seeking to merge are 
well advised to determine whether the transaction is likely to be challenged on 
both traditional antitrust grounds and under the new unilateral effects merger 
analysis. 
This comment explores the emergence of unilateral effects analysis in 
agency merger review, its recent judicial acceptance, and its impact on the 
antitrust practitioner.  Part II of this Comment depicts the development of 
horizontal merger law and the government enforcement agencies’ guidelines 
for merger analysis.  After defining the basic economic principles involved in 
horizontal merger analysis, part II discusses the problems with the traditional 
market analysis approach that led the antitrust enforcement agencies to retool 
and embrace the unilateral effects approach.  Part III describes the emergence 
of the unilateral effects analysis, focusing on the econometric methods 
developed to evaluate the competitive effects of a merger within a 
differentiated product industry.  Part IV highlights the judicial approval of the 
unilateral effects analysis approach for enjoining a potentially anti-competitive 
merger, evaluating the holding of Staples and subsequent court cases, noting 
where the court has found an antitrust violation without a traditional definitive 
market definition or market concentration analysis.  Having established 
judicial precedence for enjoining a merger based on an unilateral effects 
analysis, part IV identifies the problems antitrust lawyers must face to get a 
desired merger approved when the agencies current merger guidelines and 
policies do not reflect their current approach to merger review.  The Comment 
concludes that, while the FTC and DOJ will continue to challenge mergers 
based on unilateral effects analysis, antitrust lawyers should be given an 
accurate road map and certain safeharbors from the agencies and the courts to 
evaluate future mergers and to avoid enjoinment. 
 
analysis to support the identification of a narrow markets under a traditional structural approach. 
See infra note 105 and accompanying text.  While the DOJ has reviewed and challenged several 
differentiated product mergers based on anti-competitive unilateral effects evidence obtained 
from recently developed simulation models, these cases were settled with consent decrees calling 
for significant merger modifications. See discussion infra Part III.C.  Worried that a court would 
not give much weight to econometric estimations of unilateral effects, the FTC had not “tr[ied] 
out this new approach in a courtroom” until Staples.  Joe Sims, Making Sense of Staples and 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 1997-AUG ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 3, 5 (1997). 
 11. See SERDAR DALKIR & FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, Prices, Market Definition, 
and the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot (1997), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 143-44 
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, eds., 3rd ed. 1998). 
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF HORIZONTAL MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
A. Traditional Market Approach Prior To 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines 
Enacted in 1914 and significantly amended in 1950,12 Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act is the primary government enforcement mechanism for preventing 
anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions.13  The Act prohibits those 
combinations “where in any line of commerce” or relevant product market “in 
any section of the country” or relevant geographic market, the effect of the 
combined businesses “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly.”14 
Prior to the 1950 amendments of the Clayton Act, merger enforcement was 
largely ineffective because the Supreme Court refused to “read into the 
Clayton Act restrictions it felt did not exist.”15 Interpreting the power of the 
amended Clayton Act, the Supreme Court took a more aggressive approach to 
merger enforcement in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.16  Brown Shoe 
provided enforcement agencies with factors to evaluate the effects of a 
potential merger,17 particularly in regards to defining the existence of a 
submarket or product market within the broader product market.18  The factors 
which should be examined to determine if a submarket exists include: 
“industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, 
the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, 
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized 
 
 12. See Brian Golden, The Evolution of Horizontal Mergers and the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 170, 173 (1993). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) noted in Reeves, supra note 9, at 576.  Mergers can also be 
challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, “which prohibits ‘contracts, 
combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade,’ or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits ‘unfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair acts or 
practices’.” Reeves, supra note 9, at 576.  In addition, mergers can be challenged by state attorney 
general through each state’s own antitrust laws.  Id. at 577, 619.  In 1993, the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) promulgated their own horizontal merger guidelines, 
which differ somewhat from the federal agencies’ guidelines.  Id. at 619. 
 14. Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Introduction to this Symposium and a Guide to Issues in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 533, 550 (1997) (quoting 15 U.S.C § 18).  See 
also, F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1072 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v. Marine 
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 618-23 (1974). 
 15. Golden, supra note 12, at 172-73. 
 16. Golden, supra note 12, at 174-75 (discussing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 
294 (1962)). 
 17. See Golden, supra note 12, at 175-76 (discussing Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311-46) 
 18. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325, analyzed in Reeves, supra note 9, app. at 588-89. 
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vendors.”19  The Court did not, however, specify how these factors should be 
weighed.20 
While the concept of a submarket within a broader market has been 
strongly criticized,21 Brown Shoe’s mandate to define the relevant market and 
focus on the effects of the firms’ market share is still followed by the courts 
today.22  But “the open-ended test of Brown Shoe” was abandoned in United 
States v. Philadelphia National Bank “in favor of a presumptive rule governing 
horizontal mergers.”23  Under this test, the government must prove the relevant 
market, the merging firms’ market share, and the market concentration in the 
relevant market.24  If these surrogates for market power are proven and there is 
no clear showing that the merger is unlikely to have anti-competitive effects, 
the merger will be enjoined.25 
For the last thirty years, courts have adhered to the principles set forth in 
Philadelphia National Bank for evaluating mergers.26  Flaws with this 
traditional approach to merger analysis have surfaced, however, including 
failure to account for excess production capacity in evaluating a firm’s relevant 
market share,27 possibility of new entrants diluting merged firm’s market 
power,28 and influence of dominant buyers overcoming a post-merger increase 
in the concentration of sellers.29  Furthermore, because the traditional structural 
 
 19. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1075 (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325). 
 20. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325 construed in Reeves, supra note 9, app. at 588-89. 
 21. Quinn, supra note 8, at 428.  If a submarket is properly defined, then it should be treated 
as a market.  Id.  However, “if a ‘submarket’ does not have the attributes of a ‘market’, then it is 
irrelevant to the analysis and should be disregarded.”  Id.  Courts have recognized “that the 
existence of submarkets may be inconsistent with the [1992 Merger] Guidelines’ method for 
designating markets, but submarkets may still exist under the law.” William T. Lifland, 
Monopolies And Joint Ventures, 1049 PLI/CORP 151, 166 (1998) (discussing Olin Corp. v. FTC, 
986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 22. Gregory J. Werden, Simulating the Effects of Differentiated Products Mergers: A 
Practical Alternative to Structural Merger Policy, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 364-65 (1997) 
(citing Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 322 n.38, 325, 343).  Gregory Werden is Director of Research, 
Economic Analysis Group, for the DOJ’s Antitrust Division. Id. at 363 n.a. 
 23. A.B.A. HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 9, at 35, (construing United States v. 
Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)); See also Golden, supra note 12, at 176-77, 180. 
 24. Id. discussed in Golden, supra note 12, at 177.  See also Lande, supra note 7, at 5. 
 25. Id.  See also Lande, supra note 7, at 5. 
 26. Werden, supra note 22, at 365.  Werden references authority for overview of relevant 
cases and associated policy issues.  Id. at 386 n.13. 
 27. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), discussed in Lande, 
supra note 7, at 5.  Traditional structural merger analysis reliance on the merging firms’ current 
market share can be a misleading measure of future competition when competitors’ uncommitted 
capacity is relevant indicator of production potential. Id. at 5, 8 n.5. 
 28. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2nd Cir. 1984), noted in Lande, 
supra note 7, at 5. 
 29. United States v. Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. 669, 673-74, 677 (D. Minn. 1990), 
noted in Lande, supra note 7, at 5. 
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approach to defining a relevant market is suited to homogenous products, the 
treatment of differentiated products has posed a continuing dilemma for the 
agencies and courts.30  The significance of the problem of market definition 
under the traditional structural approach is underscored by the Supreme 
Court’s position that “market definition generally determines the result of the 
case.”31  The agencies have mitigated the ambiguity with these problems to 
some extent in the development of Merger Guidelines.32  In order to provide 
direction to businesses contemplating mergers, the DOJ produced the first 
Merger Guidelines in 1968, revising them in 1982 and again in 1984.33  These 
guidelines did not deviate significantly from the existing case law, but 
provided a detailed framework and defined economic concepts that reflected 
the government’s approach for analyzing a merger.34  In 1982 the FTC released 
a statement indicating their approach to evaluating horizontal mergers was 
similar to the DOJ’s 1982 Guidelines.35 
B. Antitrust Enforcement Agencies’ 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
In 1992, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 
who share antitrust enforcement jurisdiction, jointly published their Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”).36  The Guidelines were developed to add 
 
 30. See A.B.A. HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 9, at 258 (discussing In re Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 93 F.T.C. 110 (1979)).  In a merger of two wine producers, the FTC was criticized 
for finding two differentiated wines (i.e. a dry wine and a very sweet, berry-flavored wine to be in 
the same market.  Id. at 258, 258 n.1320; Lande, supra note 7, at 5, 8 n.4 (citing In re General 
Motors, Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984)).  If two leading luxury car producers are lumped into an 
“all new automobiles” relevant market, the merger would likely go through unchallenged instead 
of being blocked as anti-competitive.  Id. at 5; See also, infra note 105 and accompanying text 
identifying court rejecting government’s narrow relevant market for differentiated products 
merger. 
 31. Werden, supra note 22, at 363,(quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 
Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 (1992)). 
 32. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
 33. Golden, supra note 12, at 180-81.  While the 1982 Guidelines provided a rational 
framework for assessing the economic effects of a merger, this version of the DOJ’s Guidelines 
contained certain ambiguities, which necessitated a revision in 1984.  Id. at 182, 188 n.157 (citing 
A.B.A. HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 9, at 45). 
 34. Golden, supra note 12, at 181, 188 n.159 (discussing FTC Statement Concerning 
Horizontal Mergers (June 14, 1982)). 
 35. Golden, supra note 12, at 160, 188 n.159 (discussing FTC Statement Concerning 
Horizontal Mergers (June 14, 1982)). 
 36. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES (992), reprinted in 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,553 (1992) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES]. Section 4 of the GUIDELINES dealing with efficiencies defense to a merger 
challenge was revised in April 1997. See Reeves, supra note 9, at 636-37.  For complete 
GUIDELINES, see Reeves, supra note 9, app. at 651 or 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 (as 
revised April 8, 1997).  For analyzing vertical mergers, the enforcement agencies still follow 
section 4 of the DOJ’s 1984 Merger Guidelines.  GUIDELINES, supra, at 41,552. 
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predictability to the agencies’ enforcement actions.37  These guidelines set 
forth a five-step analytical approach for the agencies to follow in determining 
the probability that the proposed merger will create or increase market power 
or will facilitate its exercise.38  With increased market power, merged firms 
can raise and sustain prices above competitive levels either unilaterally or 
through coordinated interaction with other remaining competitors.39  The 
traditional structural analysis for assessing a merger under the Guidelines 
includes the following steps: (1) market definition, measurement and 
concentration;40 (2) the potential adverse competitive effects of mergers;41 (3) 
entry analysis;42 (4) efficiencies;43 and (5) failure and existing assets.44 
1. Market Definition, Measurement, and Concentration 
The Guidelines are premised on the traditional theory that a merger will 
not increase market power “unless it significantly increases concentration and 
results in a concentrated market, properly defined and measured.”45  Thus, the 
first step in merger analysis is to define the market and to calculate the 
concentration levels in the market.46 
The relevant market analysis includes defining the applicable product and 
geographic markets for the merger.47  The relevant product market definition is 
based “on the micro-economic concept of cross elasticity of demand,”48 which 
measures consumers’ willingness to switch from one product to another in 
response to a price increase.49  Hence, “market definition under the Guidelines 
focuses on the demand side of the market.”50  The Guidelines specifically 
define the relevant market as: 
a product or group of products and a geographic area in which it is produced or 
sold such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price 
regulation, that was the only present and future producer or seller of those 
products in that area likely would impose at least a ‘small but significant and 
 
 37. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,553, 41,553 n.4. 
 38. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,553 § 0.1, discussed in Thompson, supra note 14, at 
551. 
 39. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,553 § 0.1. 
 40. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,554 § 1. 
 41. Id. at 41,558 § 2. 
 42. Id. at 41,561 § 3. 
 43. Id. at 41,562 § 4. 
 44. Id. at 41,562 § 5. 
 45. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,554 § 1.0. 
 46. Thompson, supra note 14, at 551. 
 47. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,554 § 1.0. 
 48. Thompson, supra note 14, at 551. 
 49. Quinn, supra note 8, at 425-26. 
 50. Thompson, supra note 14, at 551. 
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nontransitory’ increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other 
products are held constant.51 
Once the relevant market is defined, the market share and concentration in 
that market are determined by analyzing “the productive capacities of both 
actual competitors and certain potential competitors (i.e., ‘uncommitted 
entrants’).”52  Firms classified as “uncommitted entrants” do not currently 
produce in the relevant market, but could begin producing within one year 
“without incurring significant ‘sunk’ costs of entry or exit.”53  Thus, should 
merged firms raise prices, these potential firms could effectively re-deploy 
assets quickly “to add new sources of supply to the relevant product market.”54 
2. Potential Adverse Competitive Effects 
The second step in merger analysis is to ascertain if the merger raises anti-
competitive concerns based on concentration and other factors in the relevant 
market.55  Because concentration in the market may understate or overstate the 
potential anti-competitive impact of a merger, the Guidelines consider other 
factors such as: 
changing market conditions; the degree of difference between the products and 
locations in the market and the next-best substitutes; the ease by which other 
firms can enter the market; the nature of the product; information about market 
conditions, transactions, competitors and buyer and seller characteristics; and 
potential efficiencies that will result from the merger.56 
In determining the probability of any anti-competitive effect, consideration 
is given to post-merger market concentration in conjunction with the “market 
structure to determine whether the market is likely to be characterized by either 
coordinated interactions or unilateral anti-competitive effects.”57 
The Guidelines identify three classifications for analyzing market-
concentration levels based on the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(“HHI”).58  The HHI is calculated by squaring the market shares of each 
competitor in the relevant market, then summing those values.59  For example, 
a monopolist firm, controlling 100% of a market, would have an HHI of 
 
 51. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,554 § 1.0. 
 52. Thompson, supra note 14, at 551.  Entry of “uncommitted entrants” into the relevant 
market is considered a supply-side response.  Quinn, supra note 8, at 430. 
 53. Id.  “Sunk costs are the acquisition costs of [] assets that cannot be recovered through 
redeployment of these assets outside the relevant . . . .”  GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,556 § 
1.32. 
 54. Quinn, supra note 8, at 431. 
 55. Thompson, supra note 14, at 551. 
 56. Quinn, supra note 8, at 440. 
 57. Thompson, supra note 14, at 551. 
 58. Id. at 551-52. 
 59. Id. at 552. 
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10,000.60  Alternatively, “if each of 100 firms in a market has 1% of the 
market, the HHI is 100, indicating a competitive market.”61 
An agency decision to challenge a merger is predicated on “the total post-
merger HHI for the market and the increase in the HHI resulting from the 
merger.”62  Under the Guidelines first classification, a market with a post-
merger HHI below 1000 (i.e. “corresponds roughly to a 4-firm concentration 
level of 40%”) is considered unconcentrated and a safeharbor where mergers 
are rarely challenged.63  Under the second classification, a relevant market with 
a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800 (i.e. “corresponds roughly to a four 
firm concentration level of 70%”) is judged moderately concentrated.64  In 
moderately concentrated markets, a merger that produces an HHI increase of 
more than 100 points raises potential anti-competitive concerns.65  To rebut 
these concerns, an investigation of coordinated and unilateral effects, entry 
conditions, efficiencies and the failing firm doctrine is required.66 
Under the final category, a relevant market with an HHI above 1800 is 
deemed highly concentrated.67  A merger that produces an HHI increase of 
more than 50 points is likewise presumed to create or enhance market power, a 
presumption of illegality that requires investigation of coordinated and 
unilateral effects, entry conditions, efficiencies and the failing firm doctrine to 
be overcome.68 
If, therefore, the post-merger aggregate market concentration and the 
resulting increase in concentration raise the possibility of a competitive 
concern, “the second step proceeds to an analysis of whether the merger is 
likely to lead to coordinated interactions or unilateral anti-competitive 
effects.”69  If anti-competitive concerns are found, the analysis proceeds to the 
next step to determine if entry into the market would make the anti-competitive 
effects unlikely to occur.70 
3. Entry Analysis 
The next step under the Guidelines examines “whether entry into the 
market by ‘committed entrants’ would be timely, likely and sufficient to 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Thompson, supra note 14, at 552. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Quinn, supra note 8, at 438. 
 66. Thompson, supra note 14, at 552. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Quinn, supra note 8, at 438-39. 
 69. Thompson, supra note 14, at 552. 
 70. Id. 
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deconcentrate the market.”71  Committed entrants are defined as new 
competitors that incur significant sunk costs upon entry and exit.72  If entry 
into the market is so easy that market participants would prevent the exercise 
of market power, then the agencies may not challenge the merger “[e]ven if the 
merger appears to be anti-competitive after an analysis of concentration levels 
and the other oligopoly factors.”73 
4. Efficiencies 
Under the Guidelines’ fourth step, if entry considerations do not offset the 
possibility of the merging firms wielding increased market power, the agencies 
will examine merger efficiencies.74  The agencies will not consider efficiencies 
that could have been achieved without the firms combining.75  “Cognizable 
efficiencies” are efficiencies that have been verified as merger specific and that 
“do not arise from anti-competitive reductions in output or service.”76  A 
merger will not be challenged “if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and 
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anti-competitive in any 
relevant market.”77 
5. Failure and Exiting Assets 
The Guidelines’ fifth step is the last defense to an agency decision to 
challenge a merger.78  Under the failing firm defense, the merger can still be 
approved if one of the firms involved in the merger can prove that: 1) it is on 
the verge of failing; 2) it cannot reorganize in bankruptcy; 3) no alternative 
purchasers are forthcoming; and 4) the firm’s assets would exit the relevant 
market if it is not acquired.79 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Thompson, supra note 14, at 552. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  Possible efficiencies to be gained from a merger include “economies of scale, plant 
specialization, integration of production facilities, decreased costs of freight, administrative or 
other costs . . . .”  Don Lloyd Cook, The Economic Analysis of Mergers, 16 J. PUB. POL. & 
MARKETING 353 (1997) (book review). 
 75. GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,562 § 4. 
 76. Thompson, supra note 14, at 553. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Kevin J. Arquit & Richard Wolfram, Mergers & Acquisitions: United States Government 
Antitrust Analysis and Enforcement, 1049 PLI/CORP 459, 478 (1998). 
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III. EMERGENCE OF UNILATERAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE THE 
COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF POTENTIAL MERGER 
A. Origin And Popularity of Unilateral Effects Analysis 
While the antitrust enforcement agencies have placed increased emphasis 
on unilateral effects analysis in recent years,80 the government’s concern with 
and “treatment of differentiated products mergers can be traced back at least 
fifteen years” to the Baxter Antitrust Division’s development of the DOJ’s 
1982 Guidelines.81  While addressing the possibility of collusion, the DOJ’s 
1982 Guidelines state the fundamental concept behind the government’s 
current approach to unilateral effects: 
In markets with highly differentiated products, the Department will consider 
the extent to which consumers perceive the products of the merging firms to be 
relatively better or worse substitutes for one another than for other products in 
the market. . . . If the products of the merging firms are particularly good 
substitutes for one another, the Department is more likely to challenge the 
merger.82 
Within the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the FTC and DOJ 
officially coined the term, “unilateral effects,” in context with analyzing 
mergers involving differentiated products.83  In addition, the government for 
the first time specifically distinguished when and how a potential merger 
would be judged anti-competitive based on coordinated interaction or 
unilateral effects.84  Under the 1992 Guidelines, unilateral effects analysis of 
differentiated products “is based on an evaluation of whether the merging 
firms’ products are relatively close or distant substitutes in the differentiated 
product space such that the merger of the two firms will give the firm greater 
pricing flexibility.”85  Using new econometric86 tools and computerized point-
of-sale scanner data certain unilateral effects of a differentiated products 
merger can be predicted, such as: the degree to which consumers consider 
 
 80. Tom, supra note 33, at 7. 
 81. Weiner, supra note 9, at 4. 
 82. Id. (quoting 1982 Merger Guidelines, § III.C.1.c.); see also Tom, supra note 3, at 7 
(noting that 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 3.413, contained similar language identifying that the 
DOJ would challenge a differentiated products merger). 
 83. Quinn, supra note 8, at 470 (citing GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41, 560 § 2.21). 
 84. Tom, supra note 33, at 7. 
 85. Quinn, supra note 88, at 470-71. 
 86. “‘Econometrics’ is ‘the application of mathematical form and statistical techniques to the 
testing and quantifying of economic theories and the solution of economic problems.’”  Note, 
Analyzing Differentiated-Product Mergers: The Relevance of Structural Analysis, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2420, 2437 n.6 (1998) [hereafter Harvard Note] (quoting Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 720 (1981)).  For a discussion of econometric estimations and merger simulations for 
evaluating unilateral effects, see infra Part III.B. and Part III.C. 
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particular products close substitutes, the degree to which certain products limit 
the pricing of industry competitors, and the degree to which mergers cause 
prices to rise when these constraints are removed.87 
Unilateral effects analysis using econometric techniques is now the most 
common method of merger analysis for the antitrust enforcement agencies.88  
When evaluating a merger involving differentiated products, the agencies rely 
on econometric techniques to analyze unilateral effects as opposed to a 
“traditional (homogenous) Merger Guidelines analysis” for three principle 
reasons.89  First, “collusion among producers of differentiated products is often 
unlikely,” because firms in a differentiated product market compete over 
dimensions other than price, making “collusive agreements difficult to 
reach.”90  Second, within a differentiated product market, firms usually provide 
a wide spectrum of products that are distinguished both in product features and 
price levels.91  Hence, “drawing a definitive line between products ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ the relevant market can be problematic.”92  Third, even where a 
market can be carved out, “market shares may provide a misleading standard 
by which to evaluate the competitive significance of differentiated products 
and the price-constraining influence the products have on one another.”93  
Without a specific relationship between market share and the effects of a 
merger on price, a presumption of illegality based on HHI index cannot 
theoretically be found in a differentiated product market.94 
B. Federal Agencies’ Econometric Methods For Measuring Unilateral 
Effects 
Rather than struggle to define the relevant market and make structural 
inferences to analyze a merger involving differentiated products,95 the antitrust 
 
 87. Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11-SPG 
ANTITRUST 21, 21 (1997). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Christopher A. Vellturo, Creating An Effective Diversion: Evaluating Mergers With 
Differentiated Products, 11-SPG ANTITRUST 16, 16 (1997). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Werden, supra note 22, at 367-68. 
 95. Thomas Overstreet et al., Understanding Econometric Analysis of the Price Effects of 
Mergers Involving Differentiated Products, 10-SUM ANTITRUST  30-1, 33 n.3 (1996).  Both DOJ 
and FTC have used empirical methods in lieu of structural analysis to investigate mergers 
involving differentiated products.  Id.  Economists with the DOJ and FTC have even suggested 
that the agencies and courts enjoin such mergers based on “econometrically predicted (unilateral) 
price increases.” Id.; see also Gregory J. Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects from 
Differentiated Products Mergers, 11-SPG ANTITRUST 27, 27 (offering that merger simulation 
“can replace the marketshare-based presumptions”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] UNILATERAL EFFECTS ANALYSIS IN ASSESSING ANTI-COMPETITIVE MERGERS 1493 
enforcement agencies developed several methods to evaluate merging firms’ 
“unilateral incentives and opportunities to raise price.”96  Each method follows 
the same simplified three-stage process:97 1) estimate demand parameters such 
as own-price and cross-price elasticities;98 2) calculate post-merger prices 
based on the estimated demand parameters; and 3) interpret the results in 
combination with other qualitative information99 such as “the testimony of 
industry participants” and “business documents.”100  It is necessary to derive 
demand parameters because the ability of merging firms to increase prices 
unilaterally depends on the elasticities of demand and supply facing the 
merging firms.101  Without sufficient data to create and feed a sophisticated 
economic simulation model, the agencies’ economists created empirical 
models to “estimate elasticities and predict unilateral market power with a 
reduced data set.”102 
While these empirical models provide econometric price estimations to 
initially gauge the unilaterally anti-competitive effects of a merger,103 those 
predictions are limited, especially when used to delineate a relevant market for 
the court as part of a traditional structural approach to enjoin a differentiated 
product merger.104  Because the agencies’ demand elasticities translations into 
market delineation conclusions are often disputed by the merging firms’ 
 
 96. Overstreet, supra note 95, at 31 (presenting approaches for estimating demand 
elasticities and parameters to capture unilateral effects).  See also Carl Shapiro, Mergers with 
Differentiated Products, 10-SPG Antitrust 23 (1996) (explaining basic Diversion Ratio (i.e., 
estimate of merging firms’ own-price and cross-price elasticities) approach for deducing 
unilateral competitive effects); Werden, supra note 95, at 27 (discussing merger simulation as 
opposed to empirical models as a superior method for predicting a merging firms’ ability to 
unilaterally raise price). 
 97. Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 2425. 
 98. Own-price elasticity measures “the extent to which a firm or brand will lose sales as its 
relative prices rise . . . .” Overstreet, supra note 95, at 33 n.10.  Cross-price elasticity measures 
“the extent to which one brand will lose sales to [another brand] as relative prices change. . . .” Id. 
 99. Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 2425. 
 100. Shapiro, supra note 96, at 29 n.12. 
 101. Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 2425 (noted in 2A Phillip Areeda et al., Antitrust Law P 
507, at 103 (rev. ed. 1995)). 
 102. Id. at 2425.  The more common empirical models created by the agencies are: the 
“Almost Ideal” Demand System Model, the Antitrust Logit Model , and the Residual Demand 
Elasticity Model .  Id. at 2437 n.34. 
 103. Overstreet, supra note 95, at 32-33 (noting DOJ’s use of ALM Model and FTC’s use of 
RDE Model to “influences first impressions, if nothing else.”).  As earlier as the mid-eighties, the 
FTC used empirical techniques to evaluate the “attempted acquisitions of Dr Pepper by Coke and 
of Seven Up by Pepsi,” although the econometric estimations were not used in subsequent 
litigation.  Id. at 33 n.21. 
 104. Werden, supra note 22, at 371-74.  Werden discusses the limitations of using elasticity 
estimates to “glean something about likely price and welfare effects of mergers” due to the 
difficulty in convincing a judge as to the significance of those effects and how they were derived. 
Id. at 373-74. 
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economic experts, courts have not been willing to accept the agencies’ narrow 
“relevant market” definition when based primarily on weak econometric 
estimations.105  Even when adequate, reliable data is available, these empirical 
models can still lead to erroneous predictions.106  These empirical models 
assume demand elasticity is constant,107 which means “consumers’ willingness 
to switch products does not change regardless of the price.”108  This underlying 
assumption can result in overestimating post-merger price increases when an 
anti-competitive merger generates a significant change in quantity of the 
relevant product.109 
To overcome this problem, DOJ economists developed a merger 
simulation, “a procedure through which the estimated demand parameters 
[from the empirical models] are combined with pre-merger prices and outputs, 
and processed systematically through a conventional economic model of short-
run profit maximization.”110 The simulation predicts post-merger prices and 
quantities from which unilateral anti-competitive effects can be measured.111  
By processing the demand estimates through a simulation, an analysis of the 
post-merger results are more precise and objective, making it easier for a court 
to understand.112  While merger simulations can be performed using a reduced 
data set,113 more realistic results are achieved using “detailed, high-frequency 
 
 105. See United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. Supp. 78, 82, 82-84 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting 
DOJ’s expert testimony that “prestige fountain pens” was the relevant market for merger 
analysis), discussed in Rill, supra note 10, at 409.  Lacking sufficient price and quantity data to 
empirically model the demand for pens, the DOJ and Gillette disputed how to translate the 
“evidence of substitution” to form a pens market based on price. See Shapiro, supra note 96, at 
29; New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting relevant 
product market of adult cereals and indicating that Post Grape-Nuts and Nabisco Shredded Wheat 
were part of “ready-to-eat” cereals market) discussed in Werden, supra note 22, at 372-73.  
Expert testimony did not identify how “cross elasticities could be translated into market power 
conclusions upon which market delineation should be based.”  Id. at 373. 
 106. Werden, supra note 22, at 375-76. 
 107. Werden, supra note 22, at 376. 
 108. Overstreet, supra note 95, at 32. 
 109. Werden, supra note 22, at 376. 
 110. Werden, supra note 22, at 363, 376.  Werden states that the estimation of demand 
parameters are the “front-end” of the merger simulation or quantitative analysis he and others 
have used to analyze differentiated product mergers for the DOJ.  Werden, supra note 95, at 27.  
While discussing the empirical models that can be used to derive demand parameters and then 
estimate unilateral pricing effects, Overstreet, Keyte, and Gale refer to simulation as a “full-
system approach” to analyzing a merger that can only be accomplished when sufficient data is 
available.  Overstreet, supra note 95, at 31. 
 111. Werden, supra note 22, at 363. 
 112. Werden, supra note 22, at 374. 
 113. Werden, supra note 95, at 30 n.4.  The reduced data set can be derived from “less 
quantitative evidence on suitability.”  Id.  See also, Vellturo, infra note 211, and accompanying 
text. 
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data.”114  Furthermore, certain assumptions are required to match the 
simulation model to the industry and products involved in the merger.115  
While these assumptions are reasonable, “the reliability of a particular model’s 
predictions depends on whether the assumptions underlying that model 
comport with reality.”116  After a merger simulation is run, the predicted post 
merger prices and quantities still need to be adjusted for efficiencies, entry, or 
product repositioning associated with the merger.117 
C.  Merger Simulation Utilized In Recent Merger Investigations 
The antitrust enforcement agencies have used merger simulation to gain 
first impressions in their review of potential differentiated product mergers 
and, where warranted, to support an administrative complaint to enjoin.118  
 
 114. Werden, supra note 22, at 383, 383 n.3.  Information Resources, Inc. and Neilson 
ScanTrak maintain national point-of-sale databases of prices and quantities of products scanned 
in supermarkets and mass-market retailers.  Id.; see also Constance K. Robinson, Quantifying 
Unilateral Effects In Investigations And Cases, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 387, 388, 390 (1997). 
 115. Werden, supra note 95, at 28.  The three main assumptions are: (1) “Competitive 
interaction assumed for the industry” follows Bertrand competition (i.e., non-cooperative price-
setting), (2) “Marginal cost does not vary in the relevant range,” and 3) the shape of the demand 
curves for the products of interest is assumed with the choice of the empirical model for 
estimating demand parameters.  Id. 
 116. Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 2425; see also Werden, supra note 22, at 376.  The 
choice of a demand system might be disputed in court, but “basic price increase predictions are 
not very sensitive to the demand system assumption.”  Id. 
 117. Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 2426; see also Werden, supra note 95, at 29.  Within the 
merger simulation model, marginal costs but not fixed costs can be reduced to account for merger 
efficiencies.  Id.  Entry or product repositioning cannot currently be simulated.  Id. 
 118. Rill, supra note 10, at 399.  Prior to Staples (Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1066 (decided on 
June 30, 1997)), the DOJ used merger simulation in five investigations, of which only three were 
challenged. See Rill, supra note 10, at 399, 399 n.34; Robinson, supra note 114, at 387 n.a., 389 
(In an October 1996 speech, Robinson discussed unilateral effects analysis in prior year’s merger 
investigations by DOJ, including those that went unchallenged); see note infra for identification 
of these pre-Staple cases.  Van de Kamp’s acquisition of Mrs. Paul’s, a merger of branded 
prepared seafood producers, was not challenged.  Robinson, supra note 114, at 388-89.  L’Oreal’s 
acquisition of Maybelline, a merger of two branded mascara manufacturers, was not challenged.  
Id. at 389-91.  Interstate Bakeries Corp.’s acquisition of Continental Baking Co., a merger of 
premium branded white pan bread makers, was challenged and then settled by consent decree.  Id. 
at 391-92; see also, United States v. Interstate Bakeries Corp. 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,271 
(N.D. Ill. 1996).  Kimberly-Clark Corp. acquisition of Scott Paper Co., a merger of branded facial 
tissues and baby-wipe products, was challenged and then settled by consent decree.  Rill supra 
note 10, at 399-400 (discussing United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 71,405 (N.D. Tex. 1996)).  Vail Resorts, Inc.  acquisition of  Ralston Resorts, Inc., a merger of 
prime Colorado downhill skiing areas, was challenged and settled with consent decree requiring 
one of five resorts be divested.  Id. (citing Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact 
Statement, United States v. Vail Resorts, Inc., 62 Fed. Reg. 5037, 5038, 5044 (D. Col. 1997), 
available in 1997 WL 357277).  In Vail Resorts, Inc., the DOJ actually utilized a simplified 
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While these investigations did not lead to a court decision to enjoin the merger 
based on anti-competitive unilateral effects,119 the cases illustrate how the 
enforcement agencies quantify unilateral effects in their investigations and 
cases.120  The agencies realize that the courts are accustomed to “making 
decisions based on facts about what happened” as opposed to predicting what 
might happen in the future should firms merge.121  Consequently, in a product-
differentiation case, the agencies must provide concrete rather than anecdotal 
evidence that delineates to the court “exactly how many customers would be 
willing to switch” to a substitute product.122  Likewise, the agencies must 
prove the competitive effect of the merger is of a magnitude sufficient to be 
harmful.123 
In one merger investigation that illustrates the agencies approach to 
quantifying unilateral effects, the DOJ evaluated the impact of Van de Kamp 
acquiring Mrs. Paul’s, two manufactures of frozen and prepared seafood.124  In 
the possible product market of “branded prepared fish products,” the three 
major competitors were Van de Kamp, Mrs. Paul’s, and Gorton.125  The DOJ 
recognized that if they could support the relevant market as frozen prepared 
seafood, they could challenge the merger.126  But there might not be a case if 
other products such as fresh seafood (i.e. frozen, but unprepared shrimp), or 
frozen non-seafood items (i.e. frozen chicken nuggets) were a part of the 
relevant market.127  Because the results of modeling unilateral effects of a 
merger differ depending on the assumptions and choices made in organizing 
the data used in the model, the agency seeks adequate industry facts from 
 
simulation, the “Diversion Ratio” analysis, with a reduced data set of skier price and quantity 
data.  Id. 
 119. See Robinson, supra note 114, at 389, 391, 392; United States v. Interstate Bakeries 
Corp. 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,271 (N.D. Ill. 1996), available in 1995 WL 803559, at *1; 
United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,405 (N.D. Tex. 1996), 
available in 1996 Wl 351145, at *1; Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Vail Resorts, 
Inc., 62 Fed. Reg. at 5038. 
 120. Robinson, supra note 114, at 387-88. 
 121. Id. at 387. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  Even though judges as a whole do not possess the expertise to evaluate the 
economics of a merger as presented by the agencies, commentators argue that regulation by the 
federal agencies should not unseat impartial adjudication of mergers. Sims, supra note 3, at 889.  
These lifetime appointed judges view potential mergers with “a more balance eye” and with “ a 
much broader range of life experiences than the typical antitrust agency lawyer.”  Id. at 890.  By 
“apply[ing] the case law to the facts that can be established by evidence not to the hypotheses of 
agency lawyers, the parties, or the economists,” the courts act as a safeguard to curb the approach 
and attitude of the agencies towards merger review.  Id. at 890. 
 124. Robinson, supra note 114, at 388. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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documents or other sources to support their findings.128 Depositions and 
documents from the three national companies showed they competed 
vigorously against each other with no apparent substitute for their branded 
frozen prepared fish.129  But “interviews with brokers and grocers” indicated 
that “consumers would shift to other products, including other types of frozen 
convenience foods, if prices increased.”130 
To evaluate this merger, the DOJ got a nationwide detailed sampling for 
108 weeks of scanned price and quantity data for “all ‘prepared fish products’ 
by brand (Mrs. Paul’s, Van de Kamp’s, Gorton’s, and [other minor 
brands]).”131  The agency also acquired the same data for “prepackaged raw 
frozen seafood.”132  The data was used to model demand elasticities of the 
market and the individual firm.133  Using the Guidelines’ market definition 
criteria, the agency tested for all the possible product groupings.134  Again, 
where a “small but significant and nontransitory price increase in price” does 
not result in a reduction in sales for the merged firm, then the product grouping 
under test is considered the relevant market.135 
Based on their findings, the DOJ decided not to challenge this merger.136  
This process is indicative, however, of how the agencies use econometric 
techniques to identify the relevant market or narrow the broader market.137 
IV.  RECENT JUDICIAL ANTITRUST DECISIONS DENYING MERGERS BASED ON 
UNILATERAL EFFECTS 
While the courts have followed the antitrust enforcement agencies’ 
Guidelines to evaluate whether a merger should be enjoined, the courts are not 
bound by the Guidelines.138  As a result the court can deny a merger based on 
evidence other than traditional relevant market definition, concentration, and 
evaluation of the increase in market power harming competition.139 
 
 128. Id. at 389. 
 129. Robinson, supra note 114, at 388. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 389. 
 134. Robinson, supra note 114, at 389. 
 135. See discussion of Guidelines’ Market Definition, supra Part II.B. 
 136. Robinson, supra note 114, at 389. 
 137. Id. at 387-88. 
 138. Kevin J. Arquit & Richard Wolfram, Mergers & Acquisitions: United States Government 
Antitrust Analysis and Enforcement, 1049 PLI/CORP 459, 464 (1998). 
 139. See Prices, Market Definition, and the Effects of Merger: Staples-Office Depot (1997), in 
THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 143-44 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, eds., 3rd ed. 
1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1498 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1481 
A. FTC v. Staples: Court Adopts Unilateral Effects Analysis To Define 
Relevant Product Market And Anti-Competitive Effects 
In April of 1997, the FTC sought a preliminary injunction to prevent two 
office superstores, Staples, Inc. and Office Depot, Inc., from merging.140  To 
succeed, the FTC did not have to prove with absolute certainty that the merger 
would have an anti-competitive effect.141  To obtain a preliminary injunction, 
the antitrust enforcement agency only had to prove that there was a reasonable 
probability that the proposed merger would substantially impair competition.142  
With this lower standard of proof, the court considered the FTC’s assessment 
of the geographic market, relevant product market, and probable effect on 
competition based on market concentration statistics as dictated by the 
Guidelines.143 
The court found that the parties did not dispute the forty-two geographic 
areas identified as the markets where Staples or Office Depot [“Staples-Office 
Depot”] faced competition or where “consumers can practically turn for 
alternative sources of the product.”144 The FTC and the defendants disagreed, 
however, on the “appropriate definition of the relevant product market or line 
of commerce.”145 
The FTC argued that the relevant product market was “the sale of 
consumable office supplies through office superstores.”146  Alternatively, the 
FTC broadened their definition to be “the sale of consumable office supplies 
through retail stores” such as Wal-Mart, Viking, Quill, or CompUSA.147  The 
FTC validated their market definition through a “large-scale econometric 
model that predicted the effect of the merger on prices” for office supplies.148 
The defendants argued that the relevant product market was “the overall 
sale of office products, of which a combined Staples-Office Depot accounted 
for 5.5% of total sales in [the agreed geographic areas].”149 Undaunted by the 
FTC’s ability to derive the unilateral effects of this proposed merger, Staples-
Office Depot argued that, however the product market is defined, their 
combined company would not “substantially lessen competition.”150 
While acknowledging that many different retailers sell consumable office 
products and those products are undeniably the same, the court still adopted the 
 
 140. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1070, discussed in DALKIR, supra note 1391, at 143. 
 141. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1072. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1073-83. 
 144. Id. at 1073. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1073. 
 147. Id. at 1073-74, 1074 n.7. 
 148. DALKIR, supra note 11, at 144, 149. 
 149. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1073. 
 150. Id. at 1074. 
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FTC’s narrow definition of the relevant market to be “the sale of consumable 
office supplies through office supply superstores.”151  The court noted the 
Supreme Court precedents for recognizing within a broad market well-defined 
submarkets that “constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.”152  In 
addition, the court agreed with the FTC that “[t]he outer boundaries of a 
product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use [by 
consumers] or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and 
substitutes for it.”153  Following the FTC’s unilateral effects analysis argument 
for restricting the relevant product market to office supply superstores,154 the 
court stated that the FTC’s analysis corresponds to Brown Shoe’s “sensitivity 
to price changes” factor.155  Based on the FTC’s calculations, the court found 
that a “small but significant [price] increase” of 5% in Staples’ or Office 
Depot’s prices would “not cause a significant number of consumers to turn to 
non-superstore alternatives for purchasing their consumable office supplies.”156 
The court recognized that using the FTC’s calculations for “the reasonable 
interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand” of the office 
superstores’ products is not sufficient by itself to assess whether the combined 
firm can raise prices unilaterally or without regard as to the competition.157 
The court looked at internal price comparisons provided by Staples and 
Office Depot that indicated price differentials between the respective 
companies and the other two office supply superstores.158  While this internal 
data showed price differentials significantly smaller than those calculated by 
the FTC, the court noted how the data confirmed that Staples and Office 
Depot’s prices were lowest when they competed with Office Max and highest 
where there were no other office supply superstore.159  Ultimately, the court 
found that the “evidence indicates a low cross-elasticity of demand between 
consumable office products sold by Staples or Office Depot and those same 
 
 151. Id. at 1074-75, 1080. 
 152. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1075 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
325 (1962). 
 153. Id. at 1074 (citing Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325). 
 154. Although the Court in Staples does not explicitly refer to unilateral effects analysis, 
commentators have indicated that the reference to the a merged firm being able to make a “slight 
but significant price increase” without regard to the competition is indicative of unilateral 
analysis. See e.g., Arquit & Wolfram, supra note 79, at 482-483; DALKIR, supra note 1391, at 
143-44; John Deq. Briggs & Howard T. Rosenblatt, FTC Looks Beyond the Market Shares, 
LEGAL TIMES, May 4, 1998, at S36.  Jonathan Baker, FTC’s chief economist, states that “Judge 
Hogan employed [unilateral effects] logic in explaining why he found an office superstore 
submarket and why the merger would have harmed competition.”  Id. 
 155. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1075. 
 156. Id. at 1075-76 n.8, 1078. 
 157. Id. at 1076 n.8. 
 158. Id. at 1076-77. 
 159. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1076-77. 
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products sold by other sellers of office supplies,” thereby confirming office 
supply superstores to be the relevant product market within the larger 
market.160 
Having defined the relevant product and geographic markets, the court 
next assessed the probable effect of the merger on competition.161  After 
reviewing the HHI calculations and market concentration evidence for the 
office supply superstores, the court noted that the pre-merger markets fell 
within the Guidelines’ “highly concentrated” range.162 
The court proceeded to address the unilateral effects of the proposed 
Staples-Office Depot merger.163  In addition to finding that the post-merger 
concentration of the two office superstores would harm competition, the court 
adopted the FTC unilateral effects analysis, concluding that the combination of 
the stores would have an anti-competitive effect.164 
The court rejected Staples and Office Depot’s arguments that efficiencies 
or new entrants of office superstores were likely, finding that high sunk costs 
would have to be incurred and economies of scales could not be achieved due 
to the already saturated office superstore markets.165  While the law is not well 
settled as to whether efficiencies can rebut a presumption of anti-competitive 
concerns, the court assumed that the defense was viable as defined by the 
revised efficiencies section of the Merger Guidelines.166  But the court 
determined that the defendants’ “estimates of the efficiencies were unreliable, 
unverified, and unrealistic.”167  The court also found that the defendants did 
not show that their claimed efficiencies were merger-specific or that the 
benefits would be passed on to consumers.168 
B. Post Staples Court Decisions and Agency Challenges Based on Unilateral 
Effects Analysis 
Following the FTC’s favorable decision in Staples, the court in United 
States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center addressed the DOJ’s unilateral 
effects argument for blocking a hospital merger.169  In Long Island Jewish 
Medical Center, the DOJ was not able to convince the court to enjoin the 
merger of Long Island Jewish Medical Center and North Shore Health 
 
 160. Id. at 1080. 
 161. Id. at 1081. 
 162. Id. at 1082. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1082-83. 
 165. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1086-88, discussed in DALKIR, supra note 11, at 162-63. 
 166. Id. at 1088-89. 
 167. DALKIR, supra note 1391, at 163. 
 168. Id. at 163. 
 169. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 142-43 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
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Systems, Inc., a merger of the two largest hospitals in Long Island, New 
York.170  The court followed the traditional analytical approach set forth in the 
Merger Guidelines to evaluate the potential anti-competitive effects of the 
merger.171  Despite concluding that the government could not support its case 
for limiting the relevant product market,172 the court looked at the potential 
merged hospital’s ability to raise prices unilaterally, regardless of the relevant 
market boundaries.173  Specifically, the court looked at “whether there is a 
reasonable probability that the merged entity will increase prices above the 
competitive level for a prolonged period.”174  Citing both Staples and Vail 
Resorts, Inc., the court recognized that “direct evidence” could be provided to 
prove that merging firms have the combined market power to raise prices 
unilaterally regardless of any potential response by competitors.175 
The DOJ argued that the market should be defined as “the bundle of acute 
inpatient services provided by anchor hospitals to managed care plans” and 
that the merger would result in a monopoly in the relevant geographic 
market.176  The court rejected the DOJ’s view of the relevant market, because 
the DOJ did not produce adequate evidence to support a sufficient cross-
elasticity of demand (i.e. customers would be willing to switch) between 
“anchor hospitals” and other area hospitals.177  The court reasoned that there 
was no evidence that the services provided by numerous other hospitals in the 
area could not reasonably be substituted for the parties’ services.178  The court 
found that, with respect to primary and secondary care services, the merging 
hospitals competed with numerous surrounding community hospitals.179  In 
addition, the court determined that the merging hospitals competed with 
Manhattan and other Long Island hospitals to provide more sophisticated 
 
 170. Id. at 149. 
 171. Id. at 136-37. 
 172. Id. at 139-40.  Even though the DOJ did not establish the relevant market to be “anchor 
hospitals”, the Court proceeded to review the possible anti-competitive effects of the merger. Id. 
at 142. 
 173. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 142-43. 
 174. Id. at 142. 
 175. Id. at 143.  “[D]irect evidence shows that by eliminating Staples’ most significant . . . 
rival, the merger would allow Staples to increase prices.”  Id. (citing Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 
1082).  Referencing the proposed final judgment and competitive impact statement for Vail 
Resorts, Inc. acquisition of Ralston Resorts, Inc., the court in Long Island Jewish Medical Center 
explicitly stated that a “merged entity could unilaterally raise prices without risk of losing 
[customers] to a competitor.”  Id. (citing Vail Resorts, Inc., 62 Fed. Reg. 5037 (D. Colo. 1997), 
available in 1997 WL 36727). 
 176. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 137. 
 177. C. Benjamin Crisman, Jr. & Matthew S. Barnett, Mergers & Acquisitions: Recent Trends 
in Antitrust Enforcement, 1049 PLI/CORP 379, 426 (1998) (discussing Long Island Jewish Med. 
Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 138-39). 
 178. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 139. 
 179. Id. 
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tertiary services.180  Finally, the court observed that the Department’s proposed 
anchor hospital market was “unnecessarily restrictive in that it fails to take into 
consideration the dynamics of the marketplace.”181 
The government “was unable to satisfy the court with the type of 
substantive economic data provided by the FTC in Staples[sic].”182  The expert 
and empirical data presented by the DOJ to substantiate the merged entity’s 
ability to raise prices were dismissed by the court as “totally speculative.”183  
Because there was precedent for defining the relevant product market as 
“general acute inpatient services,” the DOJ could not support its narrow market 
definition.184  Without “an undue share of the relevant market” to support a 
presumption of anti-competitive effects, the court indicated that the 
government must prove that the merger would produce an anti-competitive 
effect.185  Because the DOJ could not produce sufficient evidence to show that 
the merging firms would raise prices or reduce services beyond the competitive 
level, the court concluded that there would not be an unwarranted reduction in 
competition from the merger and allowed it to proceed.186  While no other fully 
litigated case since Long Island Jewish Medical Center has supported 
unilateral effects analysis to enjoin a merger, the agencies have challenged 
subsequent cases on unilateral effects grounds.187 
C. Evaluation of Staples & Long Island Jewish Medical Center on Use of 
Unilateral Effects Analysis to Enjoin a Merger 
Both the Staples and Long Island Jewish Medical Center courts relied in 
part on unilateral effects analysis to arrive at their respective holdings.188  The 
court in Staples relied implicitly on unilateral effects analysis to support the 
relevant market of office superstores and the merged entity’s potential for 
 
 180. Id. at 139-40. 
 181. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 140. 
 182. Crisman, supra note 177, at 426. 
 183. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 143. 
 184. Crisman, supra note 177, at 426. 
 185. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 145. 
 186. Id. at 145. 
 187. Annual Review of 1997 Antitrust Law Developments, ANN. REV. 1997 ANTITRUST L. 
DEV. CH. III.B, at 90-91 (1998).  See United States v. Chancellor Media Co., No. CV-97-6497 
(E.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 1997) which alleges that merger of two radio stations in New York would 
have combined power to unilaterally raise prices to advertisers; Proposed Final Judgment and 
Competitive Impact Statement; United States v. Signature Flight Support Corp., 62 Fed. Reg. 
7,041, 7,048 (1997) (proposed Feb. 14, 1997) (challenging merger of two of the three airport base 
operators (i.e., airplane fuel sellers) because of economic model showing potential of merged 
entity to raise fuel prices by 4% without divesture). 
 188. See discussion supra Part IV.A. and Part IV.B. 
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unilaterally raising prices.189  The court in Long Island Jewish Medical Center 
explicitly referenced unilateral effects analysis as a potential method to enjoin 
a merger.190  Both courts, however, were constrained by judicial precedence to 
rely on the traditional approach of defining a relevant market and the 
concentration thereof.191 
The court in Staples did not bar the Staples-Office Depot merger solely on 
the FTC’s unilateral effects analysis of the proposed Staples-Office Depot 
merger.192  Following the traditional framework of the Guidelines, the Court 
found the increased concentration in the identified geographic markets 
sufficient to determine that the merger would harm competition and should be 
barred.193 The Court implied, however, that where evidence overwhelmingly 
indicates that the combined firm can unilaterally raise prices beyond 5%, the 
Court would overlook any data limitations of such an analysis and enjoin the 
merger.194  Even though the Court in Staples identified a market to “satisfy the 
language of older cases and the Clayton Act’s reference to a ‘line of 
commerce’ affected by the merger,” commentators argue that the FTC first 
presented evidence that the merger threatened competition before defining the 
market.195  Hence, some view Staples as reversing the Guidelines’ traditional 
approach of delineating the relevant market boundaries, and then evaluating 
the merger’s anti-competitive effect.196  But because the FTC’s non-
econometric evidence or “hot documents” strongly supported its simulation 
predictions, Staples gives the agencies confirmation of their ability to convince 
courts that they can model and accurately measure unilateral effects of a 
differentiated products merger.197 
The court’s recognition of unilateral effects analysis in Long Island Jewish 
Medical Center is somewhat at odds with the court in Staples.  In Long Island 
Jewish Medical Center, the court was open to the opportunity to evaluate 
 
 189. See supra note 154 and accompanying text that shows commentators concurring that 
Staples references and adopting unilateral effects analysis of FTC. 
 190. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1072; Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 137. 
 192. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1082-83; See also, DALKIR, supra note 11, at 162. 
 193. Id. at 1082. 
 194. Id. at 1075-76, 1076 n.8, 1078. 
 195. Briggs & Rosenblatt, supra note 154. 
 196. Id.  After producing “evidence that [proved] competition was threatened by a merger of 
the two superstores,” the finding that certain retailers like Wal-Mart were “inadequate alternatives 
to consumers” was proven true, making “the need for arguments about market definition 
questionable at best.” Id. 
 197. See DALKIR, supra note 1391, at 147 (observing that Staples and Home-Depot had 
internal documents that showed each was concerned primarily with the other); Sims, supra note 
10 (noting that Bob Pitofsky, Chairman of the FTC, thought it was “a good time to roll the dice 
and see whether this new approach could succeed” given that they had “hot documents” to fall 
back on). 
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econometric evidence in support of an unilateral effects argument to block the 
hospitals’ merger,198 but the government did not offer any such credible 
evidence.199  Instead, the DOJ offered weak and unsubstantiated expert 
testimony that the merging hospitals would be able to raise prices unilaterally 
by 20 percent.200  Had the scanner-like data been available for the DOJ to do a 
merger simulation similar to Staples or had there been enough data to do an 
empirical model, the court may have been persuaded that the relevant market 
was “anchor hospitals” and not the broad relevant market of “general acute 
inpatient services” that the non-econometric evidence supported.201  Thus, 
while Staples and Long Island Jewish Medical Center courts consistently 
applied the traditional Guidelines approach of defining a relevant market and 
determining market concentration, the courts also looked at econometric 
evidence of unilateral effects in order to sharpen the market definition and 
provide indications (i.e., via predicted price increases) of anti-competitive 
effects in the absence of clear market boundaries. 
D. Impact of Staples and Long Island Jewish Medical Center on Antitrust 
Lawyers Seeking to Evaluate Prospective Differentiated Products 
Mergers 
1. Guidelines Must Be Updated to Reflect Agencies’ Developments in 
Merger-Review Approach 
Both the FTC and DOJ have attested to their increased use of econometric 
estimation and simulation tools in unilateral effects analysis to evaluate the 
competitive effects of a merger.202  One primary reason the agencies 
increasingly substituted unilateral effects for the Guidelines’ traditional 
structural analysis is that the agencies were unsuccessful in litigation to enjoin 
a merger.203  The courts were either unwilling to accept the agency’s market 
definition204 or could not be persuaded that increased concentration with fewer 
 
 198. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr, 983 F. Supp. at 142-43 (discussing court’s willingness to 
review anti-competitive effects even though government couldn’t support its market definition). 
 199. Id. at 143. 
 200. Id. at 143-44. 
 201. Id. at 143-44 (discussing lack of information to support price increase as a result of the 
merger). 
 202. See Tom, supra note 3, at 7-8; Rubinfeld, supra note 3, at 11.  Daniel L. Rubinfeld is 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.  
Id. at 1. 
 203. Is Antitrust Policy A Growing Threat to M&A?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Sept.-Oct., 
1997, at 11, available in 1997 WL 10614295 (roundtable discussion among antitrust lawyers) 
[hereinafter Roundtable]. 
 204. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
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players in the defined market automatically means less competition.205  Despite 
disagreement over whether these econometric techniques have replaced the 
Guidelines’ traditional market analysis,206 commentators, the agencies, and the 
courts (i.e., Staples and Long Island Jewish Medical Center) agree that the 
econometric techniques supplement or refine the Guidelines’ structural 
analysis discussion of the unilateral effects of a merger.207  Because “merger 
rules are increasingly set by the agencies rather than by court decisions,”208 it 
is essential that the Guidelines clearly reflect the way the agencies actually 
analyze mergers.  In other words, while the agencies have embraced the 
traditional threshold steps to determine the market power for the merging 
firms, they have also used econometric estimations and merger simulation 
models to analyze unilateral effects that are not explicitly detailed in the 
Guidelines.209 
While the courts have not specifically blessed the agencies’ methods for 
establishing the relevant differentiated product market or the modeling 
techniques for judging the unilateral effects of the merging firms, they have 
implicitly given credence to the agencies’ underlying methods in their 
holdings.210  Even the practitioners who have used modeling techniques to 
evaluate mergers involving differentiated products, have raised concerns for 
“guidance on a ‘safe harbor’ range for unilateral effects merger analysis, 
pointing out that “economic models of imperfect competition” usually generate 
“at least some price increase resulting from a merger in which the products of 
the two companies compete to any degree.”211  Unless the agencies perform a 
 
 205. Roundtable, supra note 205, at 11. 
 206. See William J. Baer, New Myths and Old Realities: Perspectives on Recent 
Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks before the Bar Association of the City of New 
York (Nov. 17, 1997), available in 1997 WL 728608 at *2-*4; See generally, Rill supra note 10, 
at 393-94; Harvard Note, supra note 86, at 2420. 
 207. For commentators concurrence, see Rill, supra note 10, at 399.  For agreement of 
agencies, see Baer, supra note 206, at 3-4; Robinson, supra note 114, at 387-88.  For support of 
the courts, see Dalkir, supra note 11, at 143-44, 160-62 (noting that Judge Hogan’s Decision in 
Staples was based in part on FTC’s post-merger econometric price estimations); Briggs & 
Rosenblatt, supra note 195, at S36 (indicating that “econometric evidence” was key to the 
Staples-Office Depot decision). 
 208. Sims, supra note 3, at 882. 
 209. Sims, supra note 3, at 882 n.65. (noting 1992 Guidelines address unilateral effects, but 
do not give sufficient guidance on the agencies’ implementation of the unilateral effects concept 
in their current merger investigations). 
 210. See DALKIR, supra note 207 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part 
IV.C. 
 211. Vellturo, supra note 89, at 20.  Without extensive scanner data available for use in 
demand model merger simulations, Vellturo discusses the Diversion Ratio model, a “second line 
of analysis” for mergers which makes use of intermediate data like “Switching Studies” that track 
customer purchase patterns over time, firms’ “Win/Loss (and Related) Reports” that provide data 
on purchaser bid decisions, “End User Surveys” of purchaser preferences, and firms’ “Market 
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full-blown simulation with ample supporting data, their predictions that the 
merging firms will be able to raise prices unilaterally is premised on the chosen 
demand system used in their underlying empirical analysis.212  Additionally, 
each agency favors a different demand system model, which neither the 
Guidelines nor any agency policy statements identify.213 
The enforcement agencies have recognized that the Guidelines need to be 
reevaluated in the area of unilateral effects analysis.214  With the increased use 
of “econometric estimation and simulation techniques to predict the likely 
effects of mergers,” the agencies are sharpening their understanding of the 
methodological issues involved.215  Consequently, the Guidelines need to be 
refined to reflect that understanding.  The Guidelines also do not clearly 
address the relationship between the potential market share of merged firms 
and the degree of unilateral effects from the merger.216  Under unilateral effects 
analysis, it is possible for merging firms to have smaller market shares after 
merging but substantial ability to raise prices unilaterally.217  Likewise, the 
combined firms could have a dominant share of the market, but insignificant 
unilateral power to raise prices.218  Furthermore, when the agencies rely 
substantially on unilateral effects rather than coordinated effects analysis to 
evaluate a merger, the Guidelines need to clarify the function of market 
definition.219  Unlike coordinated effects analysis, the exact boundary of the 
product market is not important in unilateral effects analysis.220  The market 
definition merely provides guidance on the products to be included in the 
pricing analysis.221 
The enforcement agencies have previously clarified concerns with their 
Guidelines by providing safeharbors for merging firms within a specific 
 
Share and Sales Volume Patterns”.  Id. at 16, 18-19.  Vellturo expresses the concern, however, 
that the Diversion Ratio approach does not have a defined “threshold level” or “implied predicted 
price [level] increase” below which no significant anti-competitive effects are generated.  Id. at 
20. 
 212. Werden, supra note 22, at 370-71, 377. 
 213. Roundtable, supra note 205, at 12.  Antitrust lawyers must deal with the fact that each 
agency “has a different approach and neither has sufficiently articulated exactly what its approach 
is.” Id. 
 214. Rubinfeld, supra note 202, at 11-12. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Rubinfeld, supra note 202, at 11-12. 
 220. Id. at 12. 
 221. Id. 
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industry such as health care.222  The agencies have created an “Antitrust Safety 
Zone” where the mergers of hospitals will not be challenged by the agencies.223  
If the mergers fall outside the safety zone, the agencies will continue to follow 
the Guidelines to determine if the merger is potentially anti-competitive.224  
Due to the uncertainty in the agencies new approach and the fact that the courts 
in Staples and Long Island Jewish Medical Center have sanctioned the use of 
this approach, an update to the Guidelines or a new policy statement should be 
forthcoming from the agencies to add renewed predictability to merger 
investigations. 
2. Clarify acceptable increase in combined market share, and acceptable 
de minimis increase in future industry prices 
The Guidelines specify that the ability of merging firms’ to unilaterally 
raise price will be presumed by the agencies, if the post-merger market 
concentration does not fall within the Guidelines’ HHI safeharbor regions and 
the merged firms’ combined market share exceeds the threshold of thirty-five 
percent.225  Some commentators believe that this serves as a “screen to 
eliminate from serious consideration mergers among firms with small market 
shares, which are unlikely to result in anti-competitive effects even when the 
products of the merging companies are close substitutes.”226 
Because market share measures for differentiated product mergers do not 
adequately reflect when unilateral effects rise to a level of anti-competitive 
concern, the agencies would not likely adhere to the 35 percent market share 
threshold before implementing agency review of such a merger.227  The 
agencies’ own economists have produced evidence that shows that this safe 
harbor does not make sense,228 which means that the safe harbor may not really 
be “safe” for firms seeking to merge.  Once again, the agencies need to clarify 
their position in relation to the Guidelines. 
 
 222. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of Antitrust 
Enforcement Policy in Health Care, reprinted in William T. Lifland, Monopolies and Joint 
Ventures, 1049 PLI/CORP 151 app. b at 289-90 (1998). 
 223. Id. at 290. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See GUIDELINES, supra note 36, at 41,560 § 2.211 
 226. Rill, supra note 10, at 397. 
 227. Interview by Michael Weiner with Robert D. Willig, Princeton Prof. of Econ. and Public 
Affairs, Former Deputy Asst. Gen. Attorney for Econ. Analysis, DOJ Antitrust Division, 11-SPG 
ANTITRUST 11, 11-12 (1997) [Hereinafter Willig Interview]. 
 228. Werden, supra note 22, at 369.  Werden, a leading DOJ economist, states that results of a 
simulation study on differentiated product mergers indicates that the Guidelines’ thirty-five 
percent rule (i.e., market share safe-harbor from agency review of unilateral effects) “is 
inappropriate because the combined share of the merging firms is a poor predictor of effects on 
price or consumer welfare.”  Id. 
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To test if merged firms can unilaterally raise prices despite the 
competition, the Guidelines suggest and courts have used a threshold price 
increase of 5% as being the anti-competitive minimum.229  The enforcement 
agencies do not, however, maintain that 5% is a threshold.230  “If there is 
evidence the merger will lead to a 2% price rise, or something else less than 
5%, they will step in and stop the deal if they can.”231  Rather than concede to a 
de minimis threshold, the agencies are advocating that their unilateral analytic 
procedures account for moderately sized anticipated efficiencies “to counter-
balance relatively small feared price increases.”232  As discussed above, 
however, these procedures or econometric techniques have not yet been 
explained within the context of any policy statement or update to the 
Guidelines.233 
3. Advocate Process by which Agencies and Parties Can Openly 
Exchange Data at Early Stage of Investigation. 
One of the lessons to be drawn from Staples is that an antitrust lawyer 
must be familiar with the “high-tech world of unilateral effects and demand 
elasticity models” in order to ensure the agencies’ econometric assumptions 
and methods for challenging a merger are valid.234  A number of commentators 
have advocated that the agencies establish a process whereby the agencies and 
merging firms share data early in the process.235 If the agencies do not share 
their assumptions for developing their econometric merger simulation models, 
erroneous predictions could result.236  Consequently, with the threat of undue 
delay and unlimited pre-complaint discovery, the one-sided HSR237 premerger 
notification process can force firms to accept unwarranted consent decrees to 
divest even though the firms believe that the agency would not prevail in 
court.238 
 
 229. See Guidelines, supra note 36, at 41,555 § 1.11; Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1076, n.8. 
 230. Willig Interview, supra note 227, at 12. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See discussion supra Part IV.D.1. 
 234. Briggs, supra note 195, at 5-6. 
 235. See, Weiner, 11-SPG Antitrust at 4; Willig Interview, supra note 227, at 13. 
 236. Willig Interview, supra note 227, at 13.  As a DOJ consultant, Willig recounts a merger 
investigation where he found the wrong demand model was being used which could have lead to 
erroneous results and unfortunate consequences.  Id. 
 237. For a brief description of the HSR premerger notification process, see Kolasky, supra 
note 2 and accompanying text. 
 238. Sims, supra note 3, at 868-69, 887.  The enforcement agencies have used the “Second 
Request” requirement under the HSR premerger notification process “to create a whole new 
discovery mechanism, unconstrained by the Federal Rules (or any other rules, for that matter) and 
free of any practical oversight by any neutral arbiter.”  Id. at 881.  Hence, the agencies “can 
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Now is a good time to approach the FTC and DOJ with arguments for 
improving the process and modifying their guidelines.239 Those heading up and 
working for these federal agencies “are more open to at least listening to the 
arguments” than their past predecessors were apt to do.240 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
During this period of intense merger activity, the enforcement agencies 
have challenged mergers based on an unilateral effects analysis, deviating from 
the traditional, structural market definition approach outlined in their Merger 
Guidelines.  But the courts have refused to rely exclusively on the enforcement 
agencies’ unilateral effects analysis to bar a merger.  For mergers involving 
firms with differentiated products, the agencies must still lay a foundation for a 
relevant product market.  Where the boundaries of the relevant product market 
cannot be drawn definitively, courts look at econometric evidence both to 
supplement the product market definition and to determine if the proposed 
combination has the power to raise product prices unilaterally.  While the 
agencies’ econometric techniques for evaluating unilateral effects a merger 
have not supplanted traditional analysis of market definitions and 
concentrations, Staples and Long Island Jewish Medical Center indicate that 
proof of a unilateral anti-competitive threat may precede the market definition 
or alter the initial agency definition.  Due to judicial acceptance of non-
traditional or non-structural factors as a basis for assessing anti-competitive 
effects of a proposed merger, antitrust lawyers should anticipate narrow 
product market classifications and continued use of unilateral effects analysis 
for assessing proposed mergers.  Because enforcement agencies rely on 
econometric techniques to review a merger and support a subsequent 
challenge, antitrust lawyers should push for clarification in the Guidelines, 
safeharbors where warranted, and a policy for early data exchange.  The 
federal agencies promulgated the 1992 Guidelines to eliminate uncertainty and 
add predictability to their enforcement actions.  Because their approach to a 
merger has again changed, the agencies should issue new Guidelines so that 
businesses can anticipate and efficiently evaluate the prospects of a desired 
merger. 
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effectively delay” the investigation of a merger through an “essentially unlimited precomplaint 
discovery” process.  Id. at 868-69. 
 239. Id. at 903. 
 240. Id. 
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